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Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to investigate the relative contributions of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA) and 
migrant remittances to economic growth in developing countries. We 
use a systems methodology to account for the inherent endogeneities in 
these relationships. In addition, we also examine the importance of 
institutions, not only for growth directly, but in the interactions 
between institutions and the other sources of growth. It is, we believe, 
the first paper to consider each of these variables together. We find 
that all sources of foreign capital have a positive and significant 
impact on growth when institutions are taken into account.  
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1. Introduction 
With the increased focus in the international community on development within the 
poorest countries of the world, via the Millennium Development Goals, attention has 
turned to the relative importance of the various forms of capital flows, and their 
effectiveness in alleviating poverty. 
 
Overseas capital flows, comprising of foreign direct investment (FDI), official 
development assistance (ODA) and migrant remittances have grown significantly over 
the past 20 years. Despite this, economists have never considered the combined impact 
of each of these variables on economic growth. Our main contribution in this paper is to 
address this shortcoming using a new approach, while further considering the 
importance of institutions when determining the relative effectiveness of international 
capital flows. The literatures on the individual growth impacts of FDI (see for example 
Lim (2001), and Hansen and Rand (2006)) and foreign aid (see Hansen and Tarp (2001) 
and Doucouliagos and Paldam (2006)) are relatively well developed. In contrast, the 
literature which looks at the impact of migrant remittances on growth is more limited. 
This paper’s second key contribution is to build on this limitation. 
 
Our analysis is set within the context of the current debate on the importance of 
institutions for development. This issue was highlighted by President Obama on his 
first visit to Africa in 2009. There are strong arguments, based on the analysis of La 
Porta et al (1997) and Acemoglu (2001) for believing that institutions improve and 
accelerate development. In much of this literature, (see North (1990) and Landes 
(1998)) it is argued that European nations achieved prosperity because they embraced 
institutions that encouraged private initiative and innovation. For this reason, if 
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developing countries in Africa, Asia and South America are to experience similar 
success, they need to adopt institutions in a similar vein.  
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In section 2 we discuss regional trends 
in GDP growth and overseas capital flows. In section 3 we provide a simple theoretical 
model and use it to discuss the empirical growth literature for each source of foreign 
capital. Of particular importance is a detailed look at the literature on remittances and 
evidence as to why they should be viewed as a vehicle for investment. In section 4 we 
discuss our empirical specification and how it overcomes the endogeneity issues 
common in the literature. In section 5 we review the data used. In section 6 we discuss 
our results and in section 7 we conclude. 
 
2. Data Trends 
The data on GDP growth, overseas development assistance and migrant remittances are 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The data on FDI 
inflows are taken from UNCTAD.  
Figure 1 here 
Figure 1 shows the GDP per capita growth rate between 1984 and 2008 for a number of 
developing regions. Clearly GDP per capita growth has been positive for each region 
over much of the sample. Yet all regions, excluding East Asia & Pacific, have 
experienced negative growth rates at some point. This is particularly true for Sub-
Saharan Africa which has experienced negative growth for at least 11 years across the 
sample. In contrast, the growth rates in Asia have been consistently higher, in some 
cases over 10 per cent (even accounting for the financial crisis in 1997). 
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GDP clearly has a cyclical pattern reflecting the swings of the business cycle. Despite 
this, the pattern of migrant remittances, overseas development assistance and foreign 
direct investment is quite different. Figure 2 shows workers remittances to the 
developing regions. From a fairly low base in 1984, with each region’s series broadly in 
line with one another, there appears to be an explosion around the mid 1990’s. This is 
most notable for Asia and Latin America & Caribbean. What is particularly striking is a 
comparison of the data on migrant remittances with the data on official development 
assistance (Figure 3). As can be seen, for many of the regions, workers remittances are 
far higher than overseas aid. Considering there has been a vast and controversial 
literature on the impact of aid on growth, it is perhaps surprising that there have been so 
few studies that have looked at the growth impacts of migrant remittances. 
Figure 2 here 
Figure 3 plots trends in overseas development assistance (ODA). Aid appears to be 
quite volatile in comparison to remittance flows. ODA falls considerably by 
approximately $5 billion in SSA between 1994 and 2000 but since then it has increased 
by about $40 billion. This reflects the political economy of aid donorship of developed 
countries in recent years. 
Figure 3 here 
Figure 4 shows inward FDI flows. The data reveals that FDI is significantly larger than 
the other two sources of foreign capital. Unsurprisingly, the data also shows the vast 
amount of FDI being done in China and South East Asia. Interestingly, since 2004 there 
has also been a significant pickup in FDI to Africa.    
Figure 4 here 
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3. Theoretical Model and Literature Review 
The underlying theory we use is motivated by a standard growth model where foreign 
direct investment (FDI), overseas development assistance (ODA), and migrant 
remittances are all introduced as components of investment (see Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), Catrinescu et al. (2009)). Each financial flow finances the investment that 
determines economic growth. Investment in itself is the aggregate of public and private 
investment such that public investment is partly financed by aid, whilst private 
investment is composed of gross capital formation, foreign direct investment and 
migrant remittances. We can write the production function as equation (1): 
 
( )θλφ ttttttt RFDIDIAGTY ++++=                                                                       (1) 
 
where tG  is government investment spending, tA  is Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA), φ is the share of ODA used for public investment purposes, tDI  is domestic 
investment, tFDI  is foreign direct investment, tR  is remittances and λ  is the share of 
remittances devoted to private investmenti. Aid can influence growth directly or via 
public investment, whilst FDI and remittances generate growth via external private 
sources. The impact of institutions is modelled via the TFP term.  
 
Hypotheses: the importance of capital transfers and institutions for growth. 
In recent years the role of institutions and the impact they have had on development has 
received considerable attention. As Rodrik (2000) points out, development policy 
during the 1980’s had an excessive focus on price reform, i.e. privatisation and 
liberalisation. By the 1990’s this over reliance became apparent and created divisions 
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between the neo-classical economics of the Washington institutions (the IMF and the 
World Bank) and the developing countries they were trying to serve. It has become 
clear that institutions act as the bedrock of a successfully functioning mixed economy 
in that the market is seen as being embedded in these institutions. 
 
Key papers by La Porta (1997) and Acemoglu (2001) have begun to look in more detail 
in terms of the classification of different types of institution. La Porta (1997) stresses 
the importance of property rights whilst Acemoglu (2001) focuses on colonial origins – 
in other words initial conditions in terms of institutional quality and institutional 
development. As Rodrik (2004) points out there is now widespread agreement among 
economists that institutional quality holds the key to prevailing patterns of prosperity 
around the world.  
 
The essential thrust of this paper is not merely to highlight the importance of FDI, ODA 
and remittances for growth, or to examine the importance of institutions, but to explore 
the relationships between these variables. As we discuss below, the existing literature 
examines these partial relationships, to varying degrees, with a larger literature 
focussing on FDI, a sizeable literature on ODA, and a much smaller literature on 
remittances. What is most interesting however, and perhaps surprising, is that much of 
the cross country literature that focuses on institutions, does so by seeking to determine 
a direct relationship between institutional quality and development or growth. We seek 
to extend this literature, by examining the importance of a range of institutional features 
across a range of countries, in order to determine whether there are interaction effects 
with the three forms of capital flow. 
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3.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
Theoretically there are a number of ways in which FDI can cause economic growth. As 
a starting point the standard Solow-type neoclassical model suggests that FDI increases 
economic growth by adding to the capital stock. Further, most micro-based analysis of 
the impact of foreign investment, see for example Aitken and Harrison (1999), or 
Haddad and Harrison (1993), suggest that foreign owned production is more productive 
than domestically owned production, and this assumption has formed the basis of a 
theoretical literature, based on the models of  Grossman and Helpman (1991) and 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). Drawing on the work of Romer (1990) and Aghion 
and Howitt (1992), this approach seeks to link FDI flows to the wider literature that 
embeds endogenous technological change theories into general equilibrium models to 
analyse the relationship between international trade, technological change and growth.  
 
For instance, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) outline two channels for the transfer of 
technological knowledge: (i) the transmission of ideas which can be traded 
independently of goods, and (ii) trade in intermediate and capital goods that embody 
technology.  It is argued that FDI has an impact on both of these channels, thus 
generating endogenous growth; see for example Borenzstein et al (1999) or 
Balasubramanyam et al (1996).  
 
Although the impact of FDI on growth seems to have attained the status of what Herzer 
et al. (2007) have called a “stylised fact”, a more careful reading of the literature may 
be required. For example, it might be the case that FDI just crowds out domestic 
investment. In addition, as Agosin and Machado (2005) argue, different types of FDI, 
for example mergers and acquisitions, may have no impact on the capital stock. It may 
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just transfer resources from domestic to foreign residents with no resulting impact on 
domestic productivity via spillovers. Indeed, as Gorg and Greenaway (2004) have 
shown in their survey of the literature, only 6 out of 25 studies have found a positive 
relationship between spillovers from foreign owned firms to domestic owned firms.  
It is interesting to note that while much of this literature highlights the potential 
endogeneity problem (that countries with greater potential for growth are more likely to 
attract FDI), it is also fair to say that, due to data limitations, attempts to address this 
have been rather limited. This, along with a discussion of the importance of institutions 
at a rather superficial level is one reason why the literature is so contradictory.  We seek 
therefore to address both of these issues. As we discuss above, we examine the 
importance of institutions in the context of the extent to which they contribute to 
growth when combined with inward capital flows, but also the extent to which 
institutions attract those flows.  Azman-Saini et al (2010) for example discuss this in 
the context of financial liberalization, but not in terms of institutions more generally.  
 
3.1.1 Interactions between institutions and FDI 
Previous research on the importance of institutions suggests a causal relationship 
between institutional reform and economic performance (Babeckỳ and Campos 2011). 
The perceived mechanisms on which this largely macro literature is based, relate 
institutional reform to development. Reforms reduce investment risk, generating greater 
returns to private sector investment and innovation, and eliminating sources of 
corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Dreher et al. 2007; Boerner and Hainz 2009). 
Based on this, developing and transition countries are urged by multilateral agencies to 
improve their institutions and national governance structures. The expectation is that 
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domestic industries will benefit in the long run, though many of the potential 
mechanisms remain under explored. 
 
Links between institutional quality and private sector development have been examined 
in a number of papers, for example, recent work in transition countries, Coricelli et al 
(2012) highlights the importance of institutional quality for private sector development. 
This is explained in terms of capital market efficiency, either in terms of property rights 
encouraging investment, or in freedom from corruption reducing risk and transactions 
costs and therefore encouraging FDI. 
 
We therefore explore the relationships by which the various forms of transfer foster 
economic growth, and the importance of institutions in this process.  
 
In simple terms, where host country institutions fail to protect intellectual property 
rights, or the rights of minority investors, then this will impact on the extent to which 
FDI will stimulate growth. This occurs not merely through a reduction in the propensity 
of firms to invest in the country, but will also impact on technology transfer, and the 
extent to which inward investors engage with the host country firms. This phenomenon 
is widely discussed in the spillovers literature, in the context of firm level linkages 
(Smarzynska-Javorcik 2004), but the importance of institutions in this context is not 
discussed. 
 
Hypothesis 1: While FDI generates growth, the interaction between property rights 
protection and FDI is important in determining the extent to which FDI generates 
growth. 
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3.2 Official Development Assistance 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the reform conditions surrounding it 
underpin the international community’s development strategy. As pronounced on many 
occasions, and argued for by notable economists and celebrities, many countries are 
committed to achieving the policy goal of contributing 0.7% of GNP as ODA. The 
moral argument in favour of foreign aid, as summarised by Riddell (2007), is based on 
a number of factors. These include arguments based on solidarity or what could be 
called a humanitarian imperative. They also stem as a response to the extreme poverty 
and inequality faced by individuals in the developing world. Many proponents of 
foreign aid take the view that ODA can enhance human freedom (Sen 1999) and help to 
secure a safer and more peaceful world. This suggests that the performance of foreign 
aid can be assessed via a number of different metrics. We choose economic growth, the 
most common metric used by economists. 
 
The literature that examines the impact of foreign aid on economic growth has 
generated much controversy. There have been a number of papers that have found 
statistical evidence either way. This empirical discrepancy feeds through into the 
popular media, with commentators from different poles of the political spectrum 
sensationalising the debate. It is often felt that opponents of aid take the view that it is a 
form of wealth distribution, whereby poor people in rich countries send money directly 
to rich people in poor countries (Bauer 1972). Whereas proponents of ODA make the 
case on altruistic grounds (Stern 1974), they have a more optimistic view of the impact 
of foreign aid. 
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The benchmark study in this field, described by Easterly et al. (2004) as seminal, is by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000). They find that on its own aid has no effect on growth, 
although when it is interacted with a “sound” monetary and fiscal policy environment 
there is a conditional effect. Other papers have found similar results using other 
conditioning variables: e.g. Burnside and Dollar (2004) interact aid with the level of 
law and order; Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) look at the impact of political stability; 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) look at external shocks; and Svenson (1999) controls 
for the effects of democracy. Nevertheless, other studies reject these findings. Easterly 
et al. (2004) re-estimate Burnside and Dollar (2000) with new data and find far less 
evidence that aid has a positive impact on growth even when accounting for 
institutions. In addition, Alesina and Weder (2002) find that more corrupt countries do 
not receive less aid. This result is attenuated by Brautigam and Knack (2004) who show 
that high levels of aid in Africa are associated with deterioration in governance.  
 
Another problem the literature has tried to address is the issue of endogeneity. This is 
endemic in much cross-country growth research. In terms of the aid-growth debate, it 
might be that aid just increases when there is a natural or humanitarian disaster; or, it 
may increase in countries that are economically successful. To address this issue, the 
common approach in the literature is to use instrumental variables estimation, but if 
these instruments are weak (or invalid) the results become highly questionable.  
 
3.2.1 Interactions between ODA and institutions 
To control for institutions in cross-country growth research it is common to interact 
institutional variables with the core regressor of interest. For example, in terms of the 
aid literature, Burnside and Dollar (1997) use the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
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policy, though of course policy effectiveness is in itself both an arbitrary measure, and 
dependent on the nature of institutional quality. Here we postulate that the effectiveness 
of aid is dependent on the quality of the bureaucracy to interact with aid agencies in the 
deployment of all sorts of development assistance. As Easterly (2012) points out: 
“Bureaucracy works best where there is high feedback from beneficiaries, high 
incentives for the bureaucracy to respond to such feedback, easily observable outcomes, 
high probability that bureaucratic effort will translate into favourable outcomes, and 
competitive pressure from other bureaucracies and agencies. In short, bureaucracy 
works best when it functions something like a free market.”  
 
The measure of bureaucratic quality we use accounts for the institutional strength and 
quality of the bureaucracy, higher country scores are generated where the bureaucracy 
has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy, is 
autonomous from political pressure and has an established mechanism for recruitment 
and training. In a sense, all core features of a free market that Easterly (2012) argues 
are important for effective aid disbursement.  
 
Hypothesis 2: While ODA generates growth, the interaction between ODA and 
bureaucratic quality, in terms of the ability of a country to effectively manage and 
distribute the beneficial effects of ODA, effects the extent to which ODA generates 
growth. 
 
3.3 Remittances 
The literature concerned with the relationship between migrant remittances and 
economic growth is in its infancy and is no less controversial than the literatures 
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discussed above. Much of this controversy appears to centre on a debate as to whether 
remittances are in fact a form of capital transfer or simply income. Canales (2002) 
argues that remittances are used as recurrent household expenditure. He concludes that 
the possibility of using remittances for any sort of productivity enhancing activity is 
severely constrained by the economic hardship most remittance-receiving households’ 
face. However, Woodruff & Zenteno (2001) and more recently  Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz (2009) show that remittances do indeed act as a tool of development via 
investment. As far as we know Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) are the first to 
estimate an investment equation that includes migrant remittances. They state that it is 
“remarkable” that the coefficient estimate corresponding to the remittance variable is 
positive and significant across all specifications. In addition to this, other studies, (see 
Taylor 1992 and Adams and Cuecuecha 2010) have found other links, with the latter 
finding it through education.  
 
Because of this divergence in opinion it is perhaps not surprising that the literature 
which focuses on the relationship between migrant remittances and economic growth 
has typically provided a set of mixed results. Chami et al. (2003) find that remittances 
have a negative impact on economic growth. They build a simple theoretical model that 
motivates remittances through altruism at the family level. This methodology can be 
contrasted with what they call the “portfolio” approach whereby remittances can be 
viewed in a manner similar to the other sources of foreign capital flows. Their empirical 
analysis provides evidence that remittances are counter-cyclical; suggesting that 
remittances increase when economies are on a downward path. However, the 
methodology they use does not fully account for endogeneity. They use the US income 
gap and interest rate gap as instrumental variables for remittances and run a simple 
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2SLS model. Lucas (2005) is critical of this choice; he argues that the insignificance of 
the interest rate gap in the first stage regression does not seem to eliminate the 
endogeneity bias. To address the endogeneity issue, Barajas and Chami et al. (2009), in 
a follow-up paper, introduce a novel instrument that they believe represents a 
significant improvement both over internal, lag-driven instruments (see discussion 
below) as well as other previous attempts at obtaining an external instrument. Again 
they find no significant positive relationship between remittances and growth; indeed 
they often find a negative relationship. They conclude that remittances are a form of 
social insurance to help family members finance life’s necessities and that remittances 
don’t typically turn their recipients into entrepreneurs. 
 
In contrast, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) use a different empirical strategy and find 
support for the “portfolio” approach. They see remittances as a mechanism to ease 
credit constraints. They use Systems GMM, following the methodologies of Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), to control 
for endogeneity and find that remittances have a positive impact on economic growth in 
countries that have a lower level of financial sector development. This suggests that 
there is a threshold which countries have to pass through which eventually renders the 
effects of remittances minimal. They use a dummy variable to show this and also 
provide two robustness checks by splitting the sample and by using threshold 
estimation. In addition, Pradhan et al. (2008) use random effects and fixed effects 
estimators and again find that remittances have a positive impact on economic growth 
across a sample of 39 developing countries. 
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3.3.1 Interactions between remittances and institutions 
One limitation of the Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), as they point out, is that the 
study does not fully take into account other possible country characteristics, including 
institutional aspects. Catrinescu et al. (2009) seek to address this by using a dynamic 
panel GMM specification, employing data from the Inter Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
They use a range of specifications and although the results are somewhat inconclusive, 
they certainly do not find a negative relationship. Indeed, once they interact remittances 
with institutions they observe a positive and significant effect of remittances on growth. 
There results suggest that the most important institutional variables are law and order, 
government stability and socioeconomic conditions. Rather surprisingly it seems that 
the investment profile measure (which essentially measures contract 
viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays) is insignificant across 
all of their specifications.  
 
Taken together, this literature stresses several considerations in terms of the potential 
importance of remittances. Firstly, that remittances become relatively more important 
in the poorest countries of the world, and secondly the extent to which they become 
more important in the direst of circumstances, as institutions break down for example. 
We hypothesise therefore, that not only do remittances matter in poor countries, but that 
a minimum level of institutional protection is required to facilitate this. If for example a 
huge proportion of remittances are swallowed up in transactions costs, the informal 
economy and outright theft, then the effect of remittances will be significantly reduced. 
In order to capture this, we interact remittances with the most fundamental measure of 
institutional quality, which is the protection afforded to people through law and order. 
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Hypothesis 3: While migrant remittances generate growth, the interaction between law 
and order and migrant remittances determines the extent to which remittances generates 
growth. 
 
4. Estimation and Econometric Considerations. 
A common problem in cross-county growth research (Temple 1999) is the endogeneity 
between growth and the sources of growth, in this case the flows of capital into a 
country. Numerous authors have commented on this within the single equation 
framework, though have been unable to more than partially solve this through the use 
of instruments as lags. Our methodology uses a 3-Stage Least Squares panel systems 
estimator that treats economic growth, foreign direct investment, overseas development 
assistance and migrant remittances as endogenous. The essential advantage of this 
approach is that, providing the stochastic terms in the variance–covariance are 
independent of one another, then this method is more efficient than single equation 
approaches.  
 
Attempts to find a suitable instrument for FDI in the GDP equation in the literature has 
been less than convincing, and has typically relied on variables that also enter the GDP 
equation (see Vu and Noy (2009) or Chowdhury, and Mavrotas (2006)). In practice 
however, this places two demands on the model. Firstly, that there is no specification 
error, or omitted variable bias in the equations, as by construction this will generate 
bias in the other equations, and secondly that the residuals are independent of one 
another, both in cross sectional terms and across time. Kmenta (1997) and Greene 
(1993) demonstrate how the standard Hausman (1978) can be applied to this problem. 
We analyse the impact of each of the endogenous variables on each other and examine 
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a number of other control variables common to the literature on growth (see Stehrer and 
Woerz (2009) for a similar approach). We extend this however in a number of ways. 
Firstly, we consider not merely the relationship between FDI and growth, but the 
mitigating factors in this relationship, as well as other sources of external capital. This 
links to the discussion above concerning for example the interactions between 
bureaucracy and aid, or between remittances and law and order, as well as the 
contributions to growth that these sources of capital make more generally.  
 
Instead of controlling for potential endogeneity with instrumental variables estimation 
our preferred strategy is to jointly estimate equations 2-5 below, allowing for 
simultaneity between GDP growth, foreign direct investment, overseas development 
assistance and workers remittances. 
 
itititititiit
itititititiit
itititititiit
ititititititititiit
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Where itGDP  is per capita GDP growth; itFDI is foreign direct investment as a 
percentage of GDP; itODA  is official development assistance as a percentage of GDP; 
and itREM  is migrant remittances as a percentage of GDP. In the dynamic 
specifications we include the lagged dependent variable, to allow for convergence; itIP  
is investor profile (captures the quality of the investment environment); itLO  is law and 
order (captures the quality of the judicial system); itBQ  is bureaucratic quality; and the 
vector itX  contains a number of additional control variables: (1) Gross Capital 
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Formation, which in this context is taken to be net of other forms of investment, in this 
case the three international transfer variables, FDI, ODA and Remittances; (2) trade as 
a percentage of GDP; (3) human capital; (4) population growth; (5) inflation; (6) 
landlocked dummy; (7) regional dummies for Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (8) an interaction between remittances and the HDI indexii; and (9) the 
interaction terms between our institutional ICRG variables and the endogenous 
variables. The interactions used are the following: 
 
itit FDIIP ×  
itit REMLO ×  
itit ODABQ × .  
 
The coefficients estimated for each of these interaction terms tells us whether 
institutions enhance the effects of the endogenous variables on growth. We only include 
them in the growth equation, the results of which are in our 2nd specification below. 
Finally, the vector itZ is a subset of itX  as we do not include all of the control variables 
in each equation.  
 
While the use of panel data to estimate systems of simultaneous equations is well 
understood, this generally involves converting the data to differences and estimating the 
system by either three stage least squares (3SLS) or generalised methods of moments 
(GMM) using lagged values as instruments to generate orthogonality conditions on 
differenced data. This is a straightforward simultaneous equations estimator following 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) or Cornwell et al. (1992), which allows for individual effects 
both within individual equations and in the covariance matrix between the equations, 
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based on the more general approach of Arrellano and Bond (1991) or the more recent 
Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM systems estimator. These approaches rely on 
employing lagged values as instruments; so with short panels of unbalanced data such 
estimation reduces the number of observations dramatically.  
 
However, an additional problem that we face is that the data contains some time-
invariant variables (for example the location variable, the landlocked dummy and the 
ICRG data which varies marginally over time). As such, one cannot adopt one of these 
approaches, as differencing the data becomes infeasible. We therefore adopt the 3SLS 
“within” estimation with error components suggested by Baltagi and Li (1992), based 
on Baltagi (1981). In practice this involves estimating equations (2 to 5) separately 
using a standard “within estimator”iii method, and then calculating the covariance 
matrix between the equations using the errors. The data are then transformed by 
dividing through by the square root of the covariance, and finally equations (2 to 5) are 
estimated by 3SLS employing the transformed data.iv As the use of 3SLS over 2SLS 
implies further restrictions in the model, these restrictions can be tested again using a 
standard Hausman F-test, and in all cases these restrictions are not rejectedv. 
 
We run a number of specifications using annual data and using data averaged over 5 
yearly periodsvi. The annual approach is uncommon in the literature because the data 
for GDP Growth is noisy (see Figure 1). As Harrsion (1996) points out, one of the 
problems in using annual data to identify the determinants of long-run growth is that 
short-run or cyclical fluctuations could affect the observed relationship between policy 
variables and growth. Nevertheless, we find that the performance of the two 
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specifications offer similar results. This gives further weight to the use of the 3SLS 
systems methodology 
 
5. Data 
The core data used in this study is taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (see Table A1 for descriptive statistics and Table A2 for correlation 
coefficients). Our dependent variable is GDP per capita growth. The other endogenous 
variables ODA, FDI and workers remittancesvii are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Other variables taken from the WDI are trade as a percentage of GDP, population 
growth and inflation. The FDI data is from UNCTAD, the human capital data is taken 
form Barro and Lee (2000) and the data on institutions is taken from the Inter Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG). We use three of the ICRG measures: (1) Bureaucratic Quality 
(maximum score of 4) measures the bureaucracy’s ability to adapt to changes in policy 
or interruption in government services. Countries that have an independent 
bureaucracy, autonomous of political interference, for example in recruitment, obtain a 
higher rating; (2) Law and Order (maximum score of 6) is a measure based on two sub-
components. One of which is the strength and impartiality of the judicial system, the 
other is an assessment of the observance of the law; and (3) Investment Profile 
(maximum score of 12) is an assessment of the factors that affect the risk of an 
investment. This measure is split up in to three sub-components - contract viability, 
profit repatriation and payment delays. 
 
We construct an unbalanced panel of annual observations from 1984 to 2007viii and an 
unbalanced panel that contains 5 year averages. Our data contains almost the entire 
sample of developing countries from the WDI.  
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6. Results 
Table 1 reports the results for the baseline specification of our 3SLS estimation on 
annual dataix. These results exclude the interaction terms. Our main focus for this 
specification is the growth equation. As can be seen, FDI and remittances both have a 
positive and significant impact on GDP growth. This is consistent with previous studies 
by Hansen and Rand (2006) and Catrinescu (2009). In contrast, overseas development 
assistance appears to have a negative and significant impact on GDP growth, following 
Easterly et al. (2004). When we interact remittances with the HDI dummy (which 
equals 1 for countries with ‘medium human development’ and 0 for countries with ‘low 
human development’) there is no significant impact. This suggests that remittances are 
just as important to countries with a low HDI score compared with countries with a 
‘medium’ HDI score. This somewhat contradicts Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) 
observation that remittances have a greater impact in countries with a lower level of 
financial sector development. Additionally, we also observe a positive and significant 
parameter estimate for the lagged rate of growth, suggesting growth divergence 
amongst the countries in our panel. In general the lagged dependent variables behave as 
expected, with FDI and remittances showing a degree of divergence, and ODA showing 
some (marginally significant) convergence. 
Table 1 here 
The parameter estimates for two of the institutional variables law & order and 
bureaucratic quality are positive and significant signifying that the maintenance of an 
impartial judicial system and a general abeyance of the law in conjunction with a 
productive bureaucracy are good for growth. In contrast, the parameter estimate for the 
protection of property rights is negative but insignificant. This suggests that property 
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rights protection may be less important compared to the other two factors for 
developing country growth. 
 
In addition, the estimated coefficient for human capital is positive which supports 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); the coefficient estimate for trade as a percentage of 
GDP is positive, providing evidence similar to Sachs and Warner (1995); the 
coefficient estimate associated with inflation is negative, suggesting that 
macroeconomic instability is bad for growth (see Barro 1991); and finally, the 
coefficient estimate for population growth is negative, consistent with Solow (1956). 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Having established the baseline model, and the importance of both institutions and 
capital flows for development, our attention then turns to the tests of our specific 
hypotheses, which relate to the interaction terms. Table 2 reports the results for the 
3SLS estimation with institutional interaction terms as the endogenous variables in the 
growth equation. The results show unqualified support for our hypotheses, in that, when 
we interact each of the capital transfer variables with the ICRG variables all sources of 
foreign capital generates growth. FDI interacted with investor protection contributes 
significantly. This may be interpreted as countries with higher levels of investor 
protection attract “better” FDI. This may be in the form of newer technology, with 
better IPR protection encouraging international technology transfer. Equally, countries 
with better investor protection attract larger scale FDI, where firms are willing to take 
bigger ownership stakes. This again encourages more technology transfer. Similar 
results are found for the ODA and remittances interactions. As suggested above, 
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remittances are more effective in stimulating growth where those remittances are 
protected by law and order, and aid is much more effective in countries with an 
effective bureaucracy.  
 
In addition to these results, conditional divergence is again observed with the 
coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable positive and significant. The 
estimates for the other variables are again as expected: trade as a percentage of GDP 
(+), human capital (+), inflation (-) and the landlocked dummy (-).  
 
As well as the results for the baseline specification, it is also important to analyse the 
other equations in the system. We do this here because this is our preferred 
specification and we observe some important results.  
 
The first result to consider is the coefficient estimate for ODA as a percentage of GDP 
in the FDI equation. The estimate is negative suggesting that in countries where there 
are significant levels of aid, FDI is limited. This is consistent with the positive 
coefficients in the FDI equation for investor profile and law & order. It suggests that 
firms are unlikely to do FDI in regions with low levels of development.  
 
The next interesting result can be seen for the coefficient estimate in the ODA equation 
for remittances as a percentage of GDP. The estimate is large in magnitude and 
significant suggesting that remittances and aid go hand in hand. This can also be 
observed in the remittance equation in terms of the ODA coefficient.  
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Another coefficient estimate that is of significance is the landlocked dummy variable. It 
would appear that being landlocked has no discernible negative impact on the ability to 
do FDI or on the amount of official development assistance. In contrast, the coefficient 
for the landlocked dummy in the remittance equation is negative. Presumably we 
observe this pattern because it is far harder to migrate away from landlocked countries 
in order to send remittances.   
 
Finally, and perhaps the most significant additional result from our analysis concerns 
the effectiveness of aid targeting. As can be seen in the growth equation, ODA only 
appears to have a positive impact on growth conditional on the quality of the 
bureaucracy to disseminate it. However, if we look at the coefficient for bureaucratic 
quality in the ODA equation it comes out as negative and significant. This suggests 
ODA is directed to countries with a poor bureaucratic quality – adding weight to the 
idea that aid is poorly targeted (see Brautigam and Knack (2004)). 
 
Robustness 
As a robustness check we also do the analysis using data averaged over 5-year periods. 
The results for the 3SLS Systems Estimator are provided in Table 3 for the model 
which includes institutional interaction terms with our endogenous variables. The 
results are similar to the specifications that use annual observations. Once again FDI, 
ODA and remittances all have a positive impact on growth once institutions are taken 
into consideration. And again the coefficient for Bureaucratic Quality in the ODA 
equation is negative and significant – suggestive of poor aid targeting. These results 
provide good support for the use of our 3SLS systems approach in the future as it 
performs well using annual observations. It would appear that the ‘noise’ problem of 
 25 
annual GDP per-capita growth is not as severe as once thought when using this 
methodology. 
Table 3   here 
 
7. Conclusion 
It is clear from our analysis that both foreign direct investment and migrant remittances 
have a positive impact on growth in developing countries. In addition, this is attenuated 
by a better institutional environment; in that countries that protect investors and 
maintain a high level of law and order will experience enhanced growth. In contrast, the 
relationship between aid and growth is not as clear cut. On its own aid appears to have 
a negative impact on growth and it appears to be poorly targeted. But when there is 
enough bureaucratic quality aid does begin to make a difference.  
 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for FDI and remittances in the 
growth equation are very similar at 0.1246 and 0.1101 respectively. This suggests that 
remittances are nearly as important as FDI in terms of generating economic growth. 
This is a significant result considering the literature that looks at the impact of 
remittances on growth has been so limited. 
 
The importance of institutions has received renewed consideration recently, not only 
with the recognition of Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Prize, but also the emphasis placed on 
these issues by President Obama. While the phrase “institutions matter” is a widely 
used one, it is surprising how little has been done in terms of seeking to quantify this, 
particularly in the context of the low growth rates of many of the poorest countries. We 
show here that improved institutional quality, not only attracts more inward investment, 
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but also that this investment has a greater impact on growth.  The policy lessons for this 
are clear. 
 
These results give a good deal of credence to the “Washington consensus”, in that in 
terms of growth rates institutions matter. This builds on the work by North (1973, 
1981), La Porta (1997) and Acemoglu (2001). However, our results also illustrate why 
there has been so much controversy surrounding the importance of institutions in recent 
years. In themselves the institutional variables are not strongly linked to economic 
growth. However, they are strongly correlated with all three types of capital flow. 
Further, investor protection, bureaucratic quality and the maintenance of law and order 
increase the extent to which inward capital flows stimulate economic growth. This 
analysis therefore hints at evidence for Rodrik’s (2004) theory that even if a country is 
below its potential steady-state level of growth, moderate movements in growth 
enhancing variables, in this case FDI and remittances may be the trigger that generates 
a sizeable growth payoff.  
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Figure 2: Workers Remittances 
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Figure 4: Inward FDI 
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Table 1: 3SLS Results 
Model 1: 3SLS 
Growth 
Equation 
FDI 
Equation 
ODA 
Equation 
Remittance 
Equation 
Dependent Variable GDPpc Growth FDI %GDP ODA %GDP REM %GDP 
Lagged dependent variable  0.1960** 0.3105** -0.1360 0.5478** 
 0.0239 0.1164 0.0831 0.1064 
GCF 0.0736**    
 0.0243    
GDP per capita Growth  -3.1973 3.3450 -2.6677 
  2.3676 1.7343 2.6515 
FDI % GDP 0.0743**  0.4589 -0.2743 
 0.0081  0.0510 0.0817 
ODA % GDP -0.0514** 0.6896**  1.0149 
 0.0120 0.0631  0.0495 
REM % GDP 0.0590** -0.3207** 0.6417**  
 0.0153 0.0615 0.0316  
REM × HDI 0.0083    
 0.0139    
Trade % GDP 0.0313 -0.0464   
 0.0258 0.1669   
Human Capital 0.1593** 0.0488**   
 0.0574 0.0021   
Population Growth -0.0091 -0.9394** 0.9892 -0.8270 
 0.0155 0.1083 0.0840 0.1134 
Inflation -0.0011** -0.0012** 0.0096** -0.0099** 
 0.0000 0.00035 0.0003 0.0012 
Landlocked 0.0824** 0.3894* -0.0828 -0.0522 
 0.0351 0.2238 0.1876 0.2268 
ASIA  0.1265** 0.4026 0.0467 -0.1658 
 0.0437 0.2353 0.1556 0.2225 
LA & CAR 0.1673** 1.8198** -1.2913** 1.0062** 
 0.0471 0.2224 0.1946 0.2715 
SSA  0.2282** -0.2150 0.9656** -1.7609** 
 0.0466 0.3398 0.2176 0.2950 
ICRG IP -0.0051 -0.0590 0.0150 -0.0073 
 0.0057 0.0469 0.0365 0.0414 
ICRG L&O 0.0808** 0.3373** -0.1590** -0.0049 
 0.0147 0.0869 0.0642 0.0782 
ICRG BQ 0.0237* 0.5210** -0.6683** 0.7487** 
 0.0121 0.0974 0.0642 0.0999 
Constant -4.0501** 13.6018** -21.0604** 30.6766** 
  0.9594 3.4494 2.2054 3.1426 
Mean of dependent variable 0.1100 1.2590 2.7060 1.8930 
SD of dependent variable 0.1920 7.0734 9.4690 8.4970 
SSR 5436.2694 193603.2190 139309.6928 169427.6654 
SE of Regression 2.6420 15.3438 11.1961 13.2202 
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Variance of residuals 5.6246 205.5028 142.7258 176.2240 
R-Squared 0.2190 0.1060 0.3010 0.1043 
Serial correlation (p)[1] 2.042  1.964  1.602  0.998  
 (0.153) (0.161) (0.206) (0.318) 
Observations 602 602 602 602 
1 This is based on the Wooldridge (2002) test, see Wooldridge (2002) pp. 194-202 
 One-tailed tests: p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 2: 3SLS Results with Institution Interaction Terms 
Model 2: 3SLS Interactions 
Growth 
Equation 
FDI 
Equation 
ODA 
Equation 
Remittance 
Equation 
Dependent Variable GDPpc Growth FDI %GDP ODA %GDP REM %GDP 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2048** 0.2860** -0.1390** 0.4421** 
 0.0061 0.0352 0.0510 -0.0504 
GCF 0.0721**    
 0.0145    
GDP per capita Growth  5.7985** 7.1461** -7.4310** 
  1.5226 1.6083 1.9959 
FDI % GDP 0.1318**  -1.1796** 1.3334** 
 0.0258  0.0706 0.0715 
ODA % GDP -0.1319** -0.6031**  0.9935** 
 0.0114 0.0546  0.0400 
REM % GDP 0.1148** 0.5014** 0.9958**  
 0.0537 0.0331 0.0312  
Trade % GDP 0.1607** 0.7501** 1.1110** -1.1158** 
 0.0275 0.1456 0.2142 0.2280 
Human Capital 0.0141 0.0927**   
 0.0198 0.1282   
Population Growth 0.0953** -0.6652** -0.7794** 0.9040** 
 0.0257 0.1182 0.2032 0.2151 
Inflation -0.0001** -0.0025 -0.0239 0.02484 
 0.0000 0.0747 0.0277 0.02896 
Landlocked -0.0704 0.4218 0.7207 -0.6635 
 0.0413 0.2689 0.4515 0.4367 
ASIA  0.1768** 1.0300** -1.6280** 1.7296** 
 0.0425 0.2372 0.3194 0.3063 
LA & CAR 0.3317** -1.2799 -2.3488 2.1479** 
 0.0752 0.2748 0.4462 0.4360 
SSA  0.1637** -0.8817** -1.2921** 1.3784** 
 0.0754 0.3554 0.6126 0.5884 
ICRG IP -0.0351** 0.1275** 0.1774** -0.1784** 
 0.0087 0.0511 0.0869 0.0848 
ICRG L&O -0.0144 0.1045 0.1427 -0.1588 
 0.0113 0.0715 0.0992 0.1045 
ICRG BQ 0.1086** -0.4702** -0.8732** 0.8397** 
 0.0219 0.1110 0.1826 0.1603 
ICRG IP × FDI 0.0401**    
 0.0043    
ICRG L&O × REM 0.0018**    
 0.0004    
ICRG BQ × ODA 0.0029**    
 0.0003    
Constant -6.4024 36.6321 64.5242 -57.6270 
  1.0809 4.2312 6.7759 6.0474 
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Mean of dependent variable 0.1068 1.2305 1.7483 2.0067 
SD of dependent variable 0.1782 6.5623 9.1497 8.2609 
SSR 122.2028 343.4628 952.9843 830.0939 
SE of Regression 4.0371 17.9224 31.5369 31.0581 
Variance of residuals 15.9028 398.0704 1029.9334 907.0578 
R-Squared 0.3101 0.2871 0.2578 0.1941 
Serial correlation (p) 1.915  2.084  1.787  0.951  
 (0.166) (0.149) (0.181) (0.329) 
Observations 602 602 602 602 
One-tailed tests: p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 3: 3SLS 5-Year Averages 
Model 3SLS 5-Year Averages 
Growth 
Equation 
FDI 
Equation 
ODA 
Equation 
Remittance 
Equation 
Dependent Variable GDPpc Growth FDI %GDP ODA %GDP REM %GDP 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2323** 0.2523** -0.1580** 0.4325** 
 0.0061 0.0324 0.0375 -0.0395 
GCF 0.0731**    
 0.0197    
GDP per capita Growth  5.2136** 7.2318** -9.2537** 
  1.8831 1.5077 2.1662 
FDI % GDP 0.1026**  -1.2171** 1.2841** 
 0.0269  0.0801 0.0644 
ODA % GDP -0.1271** -0.4832**  1.2474** 
 0.0119 0.0613  0.0369 
REM % GDP 0.0972 0.5103 0.8243**  
 0.0679 0.0358 0.0350  
Trade % GDP 0.1485** 0.6733** 0.9049** -1.2657** 
 0.0289 0.1260 0.2102 0.2461 
Human Capital 0.0112** 0.8190**   
 0.0026 0.1409   
Population Growth 0.0941** -0.7874** -1.0104** 0.7112** 
  0.0217 0.1301 0.2739 0.2327 
Inflation -0.0004** -2.7668** -2.5112** 2.7940 
  0.0001 0.9882 1.1790 1.6848 
Landlocked -0.0682 0.5533 0.8980** -0.6323 
  0.0495 0.3254 0.3741 0.3955 
ASIA 0.2009** 1.1925** -2.0512** 2.0697** 
 0.0354 0.2758 0.3699 0.2858 
LA & CAR 0.3618** -1.6379** -3.1552** 2.3519** 
 0.0560 0.4070 0.4125 0.4477 
SSA  0.1625 -0.8172* -1.3845 1.6227** 
 0.0850 0.4070 0.6496 0.5258 
ICRG IP -0.0354** 0.1346** 0.1494 -0.2327** 
 0.0102 0.0580 0.0910 0.0909 
ICRG L&O -0.0114 0.0818 0.1895** -0.1682 
 0.0130 0.0663 0.0820 0.1007 
ICRG BQ 0.1490** -0.4081** -0.8665** 0.6461** 
 0.0234 0.1222 0.1981 0.1404 
ICRG IP × FDI 0.0367**    
 0.0037    
ICRG L&O × REM 0.0018**    
 0.0007    
ICRG BQ × ODA 0.0030**    
 0.0011    
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Constant -6.8141** 40.8187** 49.5425** -76.0658** 
  0.9221 3.9109 6.1345 6.4879 
Mean of dependent variable 0.1103 1.2802 1.9101 1.8627 
SD of dependent variable 0.0540 1.9455 3.0443 2.6860 
SSR 25.6545 68.7525 161.3098 165.1560 
SE of Regression 0.1238 0.6417 0.9097 0.9754 
Variance of residuals 2.9568 70.1376 174.7245 209.2735 
R-Squared 0.3724 0.2996 0.3175 0.2363 
Serial correlation (p) 1.036  1.447  1.059  0.779  
 (0.309) (0.229) (0.303) (0.377) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
 One-tailed tests: p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable         Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDPpc Growth 3121 1.789 6.472 -50.490 90.070 
ln Initial GDP 2760 22.042 2.067 17.164 26.766 
ln GCF 2909 3.050 0.431 0.565 4.733 
ln FDI % GDP 2780 0.379 1.925 -13.279 5.972 
ln ODA % GDP 2908 0.983 2.090 -9.234 5.488 
ln REM % GDP 2227 0.434 1.790 -4.605 5.551 
ln REM × HDI 2227 0.381 1.641 -4.605 5.551 
ln Trade % GDP 2993 4.269 0.604 0.425 6.137 
ln Human Capital 1823 1.299 0.645 -0.994 2.348 
Population Growth 3452 1.980 1.602 -44.410 17.360 
Inflation 2688 59.541 739.164 -17.640 24411.030 
Landlocked 3528 0.184 0.387 0 1 
ASIA 3528 0.293 0.455 0 1 
LA & CAR 3528 0.163 0.370 0 1 
SSA  3528 0.293 0.455 0 1 
ICRG IP 2185 6.436 2.297 0 12 
ICRG L&O 2185 3.125 1.290 0 6 
ICRG BQ 2185 1.668 0.960 0 4 
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Table A2: Variable Correlations 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ln Initial GDP 1.000                
2 ln GCF 0.180 1.000               
3 ln FDI % GDP -0.114 0.178 1.000              
4 ln ODA % GDP -0.760 -0.223 -0.074 1.000             
5 ln REM % GDP -0.146 0.130 0.052 0.214 1.000            
6 ln REM × HDI -0.159 0.128 0.051 0.213 0.957 1.000           
7 ln Human Capital 0.346 0.287 0.298 -0.574 -0.043 -0.003 1.000          
8 Population Growth -0.316 -0.272 -0.254 0.476 -0.064 -0.085 -0.502 1.000         
9 Inflation 0.048 -0.023 -0.076 -0.036 -0.095 -0.098 0.021 -0.008 1.000        
10 Landlocked -0.311 -0.107 0.014 0.293 -0.168 -0.144 -0.263 0.263 0.053 1.000       
11 ASIA 0.429 0.305 -0.139 -0.175 0.146 0.160 0.210 -0.075 -0.046 -0.238 1.000      
12 LA & CAR 0.128 -0.139 0.187 -0.290 -0.051 -0.044 0.351 -0.252 0.100 -0.038 -0.431 1.000     
13 SSA  -0.494 -0.234 -0.058 0.523 -0.167 -0.196 -0.519 0.480 -0.040 0.423 -0.337 -0.415 1.000    
14 ICRG IP -0.027 0.266 0.386 -0.226 0.096 0.114 0.284 -0.211 -0.114 0.114 -0.054 0.006 0.052 1.000   
15 ICRG L&O 0.088 0.310 0.228 -0.215 -0.146 -0.133 0.227 -0.129 -0.065 0.067 0.159 -0.143 -0.017 0.239 1.000  
16 ICRG BQ 0.318 0.280 0.145 -0.391 -0.125 -0.086 0.331 -0.249 -0.039 -0.152 0.158 -0.087 -0.149 0.276 0.338 1.000 
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Table A3: Single Equation GMM 
Single Equation GMM with 
Interactions 
Growth 
Equation 
FDI 
Equation 
ODA 
Equation 
Remittance 
Equation 
Dependent Variable GDPpc Growth FDI %GDP ODA %GDP REM %GDP 
Lagged dependent variable  0.2210** 0.2772** -0.1523** 0.4031** 
 0.0058 0.0351 0.0414 -0.0425 
GCF 0.0514**    
 0.0226    
GDPpc Growth  8.0691** 10.1192** -11.2128** 
  2.3141 2.3916 2.6477 
FDI % GDP 0.2024**  -1.4680** 1.6173** 
 0.0071  0.0860 0.1099 
ODA % GDP -0.2213** -0.7292**  1.3288** 
 0.0086 0.0557  0.0579 
REM %GDP 0.1712** 0.6013** 1.2232**  
 0.0427 0.0386 0.0324  
Human Capital 0.0184 0.1072   
 0.0200 0.1950   
Population Growth 0.1193** -0.7411** -1.1289** 1.3345** 
 0.0286 0.1779 0.2630 0.2990 
Inflation -0.0003** -2.7220** -2.9637** 3.7506** 
  0.0001 0.9283 1.4973 1.3007 
Landlocked -0.0823 0.5220 0.9629 -0.8788 
 0.0633 0.3131 0.5548 0.4854 
ASIA 0.2068** 1.2876 -2.0765** 2.1278** 
 0.0461 0.2773 0.4092 0.4262 
LA & CAR 0.3835** -1.8197** -2.8822** 2.7980** 
 0.0908 0.3977 0.6024 0.5219 
SSA  0.2404** -1.2650** -1.5733** 1.7783** 
 0.1080 0.4035 0.6246 0.6888 
ICRG IP -0.0361** 0.1727** 0.2452** -0.2034 
 0.0133 0.0679 0.0874 0.1059 
ICRG L&O -0.0192 0.1421 0.1993 -0.1576 
 0.0148 0.0952 0.1343 0.1257 
ICRG BQ 0.1203** -0.7153** -1.1677** 0.8914** 
 0.0253 0.1379 0.1987 0.2018 
ICRG IP × FDI 0.0469**    
 0.0053    
ICRG L&O × REM 0.0019**    
 0.0004    
ICRG BQ × ODA 0.0029**    
 0.0003    
Constant -9.7656** 42.7644** 72.7678** -81.6580** 
  1.5318 6.2377 7.2572 7.6109 
N 574.0000 574.0000 574.0000 574.0000 
Sargan (p value) 0.2334 0.0983 0.3023 0.1918 
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AR(1) (p value) 0.8473 0.7320 1.2007 0.8063 
AR(2) (p value) 2.5697 2.6826 1.6975 2.1950 
)ˆ,( YYcorr  0.1236 0.0944 0.1070 0.1319 
One-tailed tests: p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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i Where (1- λ) is the share of remittances for domestic consumption. 
ii This variable is included to determine whether remittances have a greater impact on countries with a higher 
level of Human Development. To calculate this variable we split the sample into two. Countries included in the 
category ‘Medium Human Development’ according to the World Bank Human Development Report (2006) are 
coded with a 1. Countries in the category ‘Low Human Development’ are coded with a 0. This variable is then 
interacted with Migrant Remittances. It is important to point out that the HDI score does not change overtime 
we just use the 2006 data. 
iii For both equations the random effects estimator rejects the restriction of fixed effects. 
iv With panel data, there is also the concern that the standard errors on some coefficients are biased downwards 
due to correlation across years. The standard “clustering” algorithm is employed to allow for this – see for 
example Petersen (2006). However, in practice the panels used here are relatively unbalanced, such that the 
difference between the clustered and unclustered standard errors is small.   
v We also ran a number of Chow-type tests for a more restricted model excluding the regional dummies to test 
for differences between continents, or between levels of development. These however did not yield any 
significant differences between the various subsamples. It should be stressed that given the number of countries, 
and the number of coefficients for the full simultaneous model, there are few degrees of freedom even if we 
divide into only three subsamples. 
vi The last period is only 4 years. 
vii The data available in the WDI for the variable migrant remittances is entitled ‘workers remittances, 
compensation of employees, and migrant transfers’. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) use this measure and find 
that for some countries the inclusion of ‘compensation of employees’ (which is often payments to embassy staff, 
or the like) can bias the remittance data. We do not make these adjustments as they do acknowledge that the 
correlation pre and post adjustment remains at 0.92. In addition, we acknowledge that remittances through 
informal channels may be substantial.  
viii The start data of 1984 is chosen because the ICRG data begins in this year. 
ix Table A3 in the Appendix produces results for single-equation estimates for each of the 4 equations. These 
estimates are derived using GMM, but clearly show that the 3SLS systems approach yields more reliable results. 
